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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1606
________________
BERNARD CARTER JERRY,
Appellant,
v.
DONALD WILLIAMSON; DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; F. FIELD;
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-5782)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III
_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 19, 2006
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 20, 2006)

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Bernard Carter Jerry, a state prisoner in Pennsylvania, appeals the order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary

judgment to the appellees, who are all officials of the state prison system. In 2004, Jerry
filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Donald Williamson, Department of
Corrections Chief of Inmate Transfers, Transportation, and Records; David DiGuglielmo,
Superintendent of SCI-Graterford; Michael Wenerowicz, Unit Manager at SCIGraterford; and F. Feild, Unit Major at SCI-Graterford,1 alleging violations of his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the parties conducted discovery, the appellees
filed a motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion on all
claims on February 8, 2006. Jerry timely appealed.
The appellees have moved for summary action in this appeal. Summary action is
appropriate only where there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See Third
Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We find that there is no substantial question presented in
this appeal and will affirm the district court’s order for the same reasons provided in its
memorandum opinion issued on February 8, 2006.
In an as-yet unfiled appellate brief,2 Jerry argues that his retaliation claim should
have survived the motion for summary judgment. We disagree. He identifies a number
of theories to support this assertion, but none is viable here. No statute of limitations or
procedural timing requirements exist which would bar Jerry’s transfer from SCI-

1

According to appellees’ answer and the motion for summary judgment filed in the
district court, the correct spelling of this name appears to be “Feild” and not “Field,” as it
is spelled in the caption.
2

In accordance with the Clerk’s 3/22/06 order, Jerry’s “Pro Se Brief” was not filed in
this Court but was provided to the panel for informational purposes only.
2

Graterford. Rather, prison officials clearly have the discretion to effectuate a
“Demotional Transfer” when an inmate exhibits “poor behavior” or when an inmate,
having previously obtained an incentive-based transfer, “fail[s] to maintain the incentivebased criteria.” (Department of Corrections Reception and Classification Procedures
Manual, § 8, ¶ E(5)(a), annexed to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex. 4,
at 6.) In this instance, as an incentive-based transferee, Jerry had to remain free of Class I
misconducts for one year after the transfer and to have no more than one Class II
misconduct during that year. Jerry failed to meet this incentive-based criteria after his
transfer, as he obtained three Class I or Class II misconducts by the time that prison
officials, namely Feild and Wenerowicz, recommended re-transfer. Even if one of those
misconducts occurred after the one-year point had passed, Jerry had already incurred two
other misconducts within that year that qualified him for re-transfer.
Jerry also challenges the district court’s conclusion that he had failed to support a
retaliation claim under Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). In that case, we
explained that, for a retaliation claim, an inmate must demonstrate that he was engaged in
a constitutionally protected activity, that he suffered some adverse action at the hands of
the defendants, and that there was a causal link between the constitutionally-protected
activity and the adverse action. Id. As we noted, however, even if those three elements
are proved, prison officials may still prevail if they can show that they would have
undertaken the same action despite the protected conduct “for reasons reasonably related
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to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 334. Even assuming, arguendo, that Jerry
could have proved that his letters to the governor were considered a constitutionallyprotected activity, that appellees took actions to deter the exercise of his rights, and that
the activity was the substantial motivating factor behind the officers’ recommendation for
re-transfer (none of which he did prove), the officers were entitled to prevail because
Jerry’s behavior–including three misconducts–provided sufficient, penologically
grounded reasons for the staff to recommend his re-transfer.
Finally, Jerry argues that his experience at SCI-Graterford and the circumstances
surrounding his re-transfer constituted atypical and significant hardships. See, e.g., Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). But just as the district court pointed out, Jerry did
not have a protected liberty interest in the re-transfer entitling him to due process
protection in the first place. Pennsylvania code clearly states that an inmate does not have
a right to be housed in a particular facility. 37 Pa. Code § 93.11(a). Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate has no due process right to be
incarcerated in a particular institution whether it be inside the state of conviction, or
outside that state. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983). Jerry’s transfer
therefore did not implicate the due process clause. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-487.3
We will summarily affirm the district court’s order entered on February 8, 2006.
3

To the extent that Jerry contends the circumstances surrounding his last misconduct
involving a fight with another inmate violated his rights, the time that he spent in
administrative custody as a result of the misconduct did not constitute an “atypical and
significant hardship” implicating due process rights. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.
4

The motion to proceed on the original record will be denied.
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